I analyze the impact of changes to collateral value on borrowers' default decision on auto loans using two types of natural experiments in Sri Lanka. Changes in vehicle import tax rates and loan-to-value ratio caps on auto loans generated plausibly exogenous variation in the resale value of vehicles already pledged as collateral. Using proprietary auto loan performance data, I estimate that a 10% drop in the collateral value corresponds to a 44% increase in the default rate. I also find that collateral value is more important for borrowers with higher outstanding loan balances.
Strategic default refers to the decision by a borrower to stop making payments on a debt despite having the ability to make the payments. Economic theory predicts 'strategic default' when the value of the collateral drops sufficiently (Hart and Moore, 1998; Hart, 2009; Titman and Torous, 1989; Campbell and Cocco, 2015) . However, due to countervailing non-financial factors, borrowers may opt to continue repaying even when default is optimal (Bursztyn et al., 2015; Guiso et al., 2013; Bhutta et al., 2017) .
1 Therefore, the extent to which the collateral value affects borrowers' default decision is an empirical question, which is of interest to both academics and policymakers.
The greatest challenge in empirically identifying the effect of collateral value on default is finding a source of variation in collateral value that is otherwise uncorrelated with unobserved factors-such as local economic conditions and borrowers' cost of default-that influence borrowers' default risk. Although previous studies demonstrate that default is more likely, ceteris paribus, for a borrower who experiences a larger drop in collateral value (Deng et al., 2000; Bajari et al., 2008; Foote et al., 2008) , failure to control for these confounding factors precludes causal inference.
In this paper, I isolate the collateral value channel in borrowers' default decision by exploiting several policy changes that generated plausibly exogenous variation in the resale value of vehicles already pledged as collateral for auto loans in Sri Lanka. My identification strategy hinges on the notion that while these variations in collateral value impact borrowers' incentives to strategically default, they are not correlated with unobserved factors that influence borrowers' default risk. Another feature of these policy changes is that they impacted certain classes of vehicles only, which allows me to use comparable unaffected vehicle types as control samples in a difference-in-difference setting. Moreover, unlike in more developed countries, defaulting on auto loans is an important financial decision for borrowers in Sri Lanka. Due to high import tax rates (approximately 200%), vehicles constitute a large fraction of a vehicle owner's wealth-sometimes more than their home.
I use a large proprietary database of auto loan transactions from a major auto loan lender in Sri Lanka. This dataset includes a wide span of loan-level data at origination and monthby-month stream of payments made by the borrower, while also indicating whether (and, if so, when) the loan is in default.
I exploit two types of policy changes: (1) changes to vehicle import tax rates and (2) revisions to loan-to-value ratio caps on auto loans. In the first set of tests, I use three unanticipated vehicle import tax rate changes: a November 2014 import tax rate cut for cars with an engine capacity less than 1L (henceforth, smaller-engine cars) and two import tax rate hikes for new 3-wheelers in November 2015 and April 2016. 2 In the case of the tax rate cut on smaller-engine cars, cars with engine capacity greater than 1L (henceforth, larger-engine cars) serve as the control sample.
3 When analyzing the impact of tax rate hikes on 3-wheeler loans, to ensure that my control group is comparable, I construct matched samples using loans offered for other unaffected vehicle types based on similar borrower profiles and type of vehicle use.
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Even though import tax rate changes did not directly impact used vehicles, we expect resale value of smaller-engine cars to drop due to increased relative demand for new smaller-engine cars following the tax cut. Similarly, resale value of 3-wheelers is expected to increase following the tax rate increases. As expected, I find that the decrease in import tax rates on smallerengine cars led to a 10.2% decrease in the resale value of smaller-engine cars relative to that of larger-engine cars. The resale value of 3-wheelers increased on average by 8.7% following the import tax rate hikes, relative to the control sample.
Having established that import tax rate changes impacted the resale value of vehicles, I
turn to estimating the effect of import tax rate changes on default. Using these tax rate changes as treatments, I apply the standard difference-in-difference methodology to loan-month 2 3-wheelers are also known as auto-rickshaws, tuk-tuks or trishaws. These are motorized vehicles with three wheels mainly used as taxis in Sri Lanka.
3 larger-engine cars were not affected by the November 2014 tax rate change 4 3-wheelers are mainly used as a productive asset (as opposed to a consumption asset) and one of the control samples is restricted to loans used to finance the purchase of vehicles that are used for productive purposes observations. Treated loans finance vehicle types affected by a tax rate change and originated prior to that respective tax rate change. The detailed data allows for a rich set of controls, including fixed effects for loans and district-months. After the tax cut, I expect the default rate to increase for smaller-engine car loans in comparison to the default rate for the unaffected larger-engine car loans. Likewise, the default rate of 3-wheeler loans is expected to drop relative to the control sample, following tax rate hikes.
I find strong evidence for significant effect of import tax rate changes on borrower default decisions. The default rate on smaller-engine car loans rose by 0.4% following the tax rate cut.
The unconditional probability of default prior to the tax change was 0.9% and the estimated effect corresponds to a 44% higher probability of default. The default rate of 3-wheeler loans fell by 0.3%, which corresponds to a 24% lower probability of default.
In the second set of tests, I estimate the effect of loan-to-value ratio (LTV) cap changes on default rates. In Sri Lanka, auto loans originated prior to 2017 were subject to an LTV cap of 70%. In January 2017, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka revised the LTV caps applicable for auto loans financing new vehicles based on vehicle type-rising for some and decreasing for others. Specifically, according to new rules, a person buying a new car, SUV, or van can only obtain financing up to 50% of the value of the vehicle, while the LTV cap was reduced to 25% for new 3-wheelers. For new trucks and buses, lenders are allowed to finance up to 90% of the value. The LTV cap for used vehicle loans remained unchanged at 70%.
These changes affected the resale values of vehicles that were pledged as collateral before January 2017. Consider cars, whose LTV cap was reduced. This tighter LTV cap raises downpayment requirements to buy a new car, forcing some borrowers into the used-vehicle market.
The down-payment requirement for a used car is then much lower since a higher LTV cap of 70% (as opposed to 50%) applied to lower valuations. With the emerging higher demand for used cars, the value of those pledged before the reform will thus rise, curbing borrower incentives to strategically default. Similarly, for vehicle types where LTV cap is increased, borrower incentives to strategically default would rise.
In this setting, I use a generalized difference-in-difference approach with dummy variables indicating loan-months of each vehicle type after new LTV rules. The sample comprises loanmonth observations before and after the rule change on all loans originated prior to the rule change. Evidence from LTV cap changes presents effects similar to those from import tax rate changes: vehicle types with newly increased LTV caps, which curbed used-vehicle demand, lead to increased default rates; vehicle types with newly lowered LTV caps saw a drop in default rate.
The main assumption underlying my approach is that absent the tax-LTV policy changes, the average default rate in the treated and control groups would have trended in parallel.
Difference-in-difference plots suggest that default rates moved in parallel before the treatments, providing evidence in support for parallel trends assumption. Furthermore, placebo tests simulating the reforms at earlier dates confirm that the results are not driven by preexisting trends inherent to specific vehicle types.
Another concern I address is equity extraction. If liquidity-constrained borrowers could extract increased equity in the form of a secondary loan following gains in collateral value, then my results may be picking up the impact of relaxed liquidity constraints. However, I do not observe any increase in loan balances in my data which allows me to track loan balances from month to month. Also, regulations do not allow borrowers to pledge the same asset as collateral for a secondary loan with another lender.
My findings contribute to two strands of literature. I contribute to the household finance literature by using policy-induced exogenous variation in collateral value to study the causal effect of collateral value changes on strategic default. The work of Palmer (2015) , that uses long-run regional variation in house-price cyclicality as an instrument for house price declines, comes closest to my paper. To my knowledge, no other previous study has used actual transactional data to identify the causal link between collateral value and strategic default. Guiso et al. (2013) and Bajari et al. (2008) use survey data and structural estimation respectively to understand how borrowers' willingness to default changes with the home-equity shortfall. The existing work that identifies strategic default behavior does not provide evidence on the collateral value channel (Mayer et al., 2014; Yannelis, 2017; Blouin and Macchiavello, 2017; Artavanis and Spyridopoulos, 2018) . Studies, such as Deng et al. (2000) ; Bajari et al. (2008) ; Foote et al. (2008) ; Scharlemann and Shore (2016) , show a negative association between collateral value and default, but do not allow for causal inference. Identification of the collateral value channel is particularly relevant for ex-ante policy interventions, such as loan-to-value restrictions and mortgage insurance, which have been implemented under the assumption that collateral value is an important determinant of strategic default, despite limited empirical evidence.
This study also contributes to the empirical literature on contractual imperfections and defaults by examining how contractual defaults respond to unanticipated changes in market conditions. Theoretical models suggest that parties to a self-enforcing agreement have incentive to engage in 'hold-up' when market conditions change sufficiently to place the business relationship outside its self-enforcing range (Klein, 1996; Hart, 2009) . A recent study by Blouin and Macchiavello (2017) provides evidence to support this prediction by showing that unanticipated rises in coffee market prices increase defaults on coffee pre-financing agreements.
I complement their study by showing unanticipated drops in collateral value lead to more defaults.
In addition, this paper also adds to the literature on the determinants of auto loan defaults. Agarwal et al. (2008) study the relationship between borrower consumption choices and future auto loan performance. Heitfield and Sabarwal (2004) , Ghulam and Hill (2017) and Wu and Zhao (2016) look at the determinants of auto loan default.
Finally, this paper presents direct evidence on the effect of unanticipated policy reforms in the Sri Lankan auto finance market. I show that an unintended consequence of selective import tax cuts and LTV cap increases was to increase the number of strategic defaults for certain types of loans. I also quantify the impact on the resale values of vehicles due to these policy reforms.
Theoretical and Institutional Background

Role of Collateral Value in Strategic Default
Option theoretic models predict strategic default when a drop in collateral value makes the present value of continued loan repayment less than that of defaulting (Foster and Van Order, 1984; Kau et al., 1987; Titman and Torous, 1989; Campbell and Cocco, 2015) . In contract theory, the strategic default occurs when the collateral value drops sufficiently to place the relationship between a lender and a borrower outside its self-enforcing range (Klein, 1996; Hart, 2009 ).
Some studies, however, have suggested that borrowers strategically default less often than their financial incentives suggest. Foote et al. (2008) find that only 6.4% of "underwater" mortgage borrowers in Massachusetts chose to strategically default in early 1990s. Bhutta et al. (2017) show that borrowers serviced home loans until falling deeply underwater. Gerardi et al. (2017) note that 96% of low equity borrowers with ability to pay remained current on their mortgages. This is likely due to countervailing non-financial factors-such as moral aversion to default (Bursztyn et al., 2015; Guiso et al., 2013) , emotional attachment (Guiso et al., 2013; Bhutta et al., 2017) , fear over the perceived consequences of default (White, 2010; Seiler et al., 2012 ), people's subjective expectations (Kuhnen and Melzer, 2017) , inattention (Andersen et al., 2015; Agarwal et al., 2015) and financial illiteracy (Burke and Mihaly, 2012) that may cause borrowers to continue repaying loans regardless of collateral value. Therefore, the extent to which borrowers respond to changes in collateral value is an empirical question and there has been limited compelling empirical evidence on the causal effect of collateral value on strategic default (Deng et al., 2000; Bajari et al., 2008; Foote et al., 2008; Palmer, 2015; Scharlemann and Shore, 2016) .
Isolating default due to collateral value is important for contract design, ex-ante policy issues (e.g: maximum loan-to-value ratio restrictions, underwriting standards, and mortgage insurance) and ex-post remedies (e.g: loan modification and foreclosure moratorium). If col-lateral value does not play an important role in borrowers' default behavior, then it limits the scope for credit market regulations such as loan-to-value restrictions or stricter underwriting standards. Understanding the role of collateral value in borrowers' default decision is important in gauging the cost of moral hazard in potential ex-post policy responses.
Auto Finance Market in Sri Lanka
This section details the Sri Lankan auto finance market. Due to severe import tax rates (≈ 200%), vehicles are very expensive and often considered a luxury in Sri Lanka. New compact sedans, like the Honda Civic, were priced at nearly LKR 7 million (≈ USD 47,000) in 2014. Popular small cars, such as Maruti Altos, cost around LKR 2 million (≈ USD 14,000).
According to Household Income and Expenditure Survey, the mean annual Sri Lankan household income for 2012-13 was LKR 550,000 (≈ USD 3,700) and therefore a vehicle comprises a large fraction of a vehicle owner's wealth. This also means that both the auto loan liabilities and monthly repayment amounts are significant fractions of their balance sheets and monthly cash flow respectively.
In Sri Lanka, Non-Bank Finance Institutions (NBFI) are the leader in the auto finance market. NBFIs are regulated by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Regulatory requirements include minimum capital adequacy ratios and listing on the Colombo Stock Exchange. This NBFI segment is a key player in Sri Lanka's financial sector holding 13% of total assets among depository institutions. By year-end 2014, there were 56 NBFIs, many of which are involved predominantly in auto loan business. As of December 2014 auto loans represented more than 70% of the NBFI sector lending portfolios. These institutions attract higher risk borrowers who are unable to obtain auto financing from commercial banks. Auto loans through NBFIs are processed promptly, often within hours as opposed to a few weeks for a commercial bank, and borrowers are charged a high interest rate. NBFIs enlist aggressive collection practices to minimize losses. A typical auto loan is a fixed rate loan with a maturity of 4-to 6-years and a severe prepayment penalty.
The Credit Information Bureau of Sri Lanka (CRIB) provides credit information on current and prospective borrowers to lending institutions. Data include borrower identification, information regarding current and past credit facilities such as mortgages, auto loans and credit cards and payment histories. The CRIB report is one of the first documents analyzed by loan officers, before processing a request to finance any individual loan.
Policy Changes
In this paper, I use two types policy changes that generated variation in collateral value that is unrelated to unobserved factors that influence borrowers' default risk: (1) changes vehicle import tax rates and (2) changes to loan-to-value ratio caps.
Import Tax Rate Changes
I use three unanticipated import tax rate changes: a November 2014 tax cut on cars with engines under 1L (smaller-engine cars) and November 2015 and April 2016 tax hikes on 3-wheeler imports Tax Cut on Smaller-Engine Cars. In November 2014, the Sri Lankan government announced a cut in import tax rates for smaller-engine cars, which came into effect the following day. This change came as a surprise to many since there was no dialogue regarding this change prior to November 2014. As the red line in Figure 1 depicts, this change triggered a price drop of about 25% for smaller-engine cars imported after the tax reduction. On the other hand, there was no change in the price for car imports with engines exceeding 1L (larger-engine cars). The tax cut posed an indirect negative effect on the demand for used smaller-engine cars when these new imports became more affordable. This resulted in a drop in resale values of smaller-engine cars imported prior to the tax cut (formal evidence is presented later in the paper). Therefore, we expect borrowers who purchased smaller-engine cars to default more following the tax cut, relative to the borrowers who purchased larger-engine cars.
Tax Hikes on 3-wheeler Imports. The number of 3-wheelers, which serve mainly as taxis, increased steadily from about 400,000 in 2007 to over one million in 2015. This rapid rise raised concerns regarding increased air pollution, traffic and road accidents caused by 3-wheelers. As a part of Sri Lankan government efforts to reduce the growth in 3-wheelers, the import tax After each tax hike, values for used 3-wheelers increases by about 10%. It is clear from Figure   3 that the tax hikes were not foreseen since the volume of new 3-wheelers purchases did not spike prior to the announcement. The sharp post-announcement rise reflects sale of dealer inventory imported before the tax hikes.
Changes in Maximum Loan-to-Value Ratio
In a bid to curtail the vehicle imports weighing on the country's balance of payment, on 14 September 2015, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka decreed a loan-to-value (LTV) cap of 70% per vehicle for all types of vehicles.
In November 2016, the government proposed that maximum LTVs be revised again in its 2017 national budget proposals. In January 2017, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka issued a directive clarifying the budget proposals for lender compliance, dramatically reducing LTV cap to 25% for new 3-wheelers and 50% for new motor cars, SUVs and vans from the previous 70% blanket cap. Moreover, LTV cap for trucks and buses were revised upwards to 90%. The order applied only to new vehicles, leaving cap of 70% for older ones intact. Panels A through C in Figure 4 show changes in LTV cap for each new vehicle type. The bunching at the LTV caps suggests that the new LTV restrictions are binding.
The key implication of this reduction in LTV cap for new cars, SUVs, vans and 3-wheelers was that it cut the demand for new vehicles in these categories while increasing the demand for similar used vehicle types. Some of the borrowers who wanted to purchase a new car, SUV, van or a 3-wheeler would not be able to afford the high down payment and would be forced to the used-vehicle market since the down-payment requirement for a used vehicle in these categories would be much lower due to higher LTV cap is applied to lower valuations. Thus, the resale value of vehicles already pledged as collateral would rise (formal evidence presented later). Secondary market value of used trucks and buses would drop with the demand for new (used) trucks and buses rising (falling) after the recent loosening in LTV cap up to 90%.
Data and Sample Construction 2.1 Data
I obtained access to the internal records of one of the five largest non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) in Sri Lanka, representing, in 2014, more than 10% of the total assets of NBFI. This data set includes a wide span of loan-level data at origination, including the amount, vehicle valuation, term, interest rate, and borrower characteristics for each loan issued by this NBFI from January 2012 to August 2017 (comprising 396,551 loans). The data set also includes month-by-month stream of payments made by the borrower, while also indicating whether (and, if so, when) the loan is in default. 3-wheelers make up 55% of the NBFIs portfolio, motorcycles account for 15%, cars amount to 11%, vans comprise 5%, and trucks constitute 4% of the total number of loans.
Sample Construction
This paper's empirical analysis deploys three primary data sets constructed from the above database. First data set is used in the tests that use tax cut for smaller-engine cars in November 2014 as the treatment. This data set is restricted to only those loans used to purchase vehicles before May 2014 (five months before the tax cut) and where the final payment came due after April 2015 (five months after the tax cut). Smaller-engine cars are the treated sample and larger-engine cars with valuation less than LKR 3 million are the control sample. Larger-engine cars were not impacted by the tax cut (treatment) and larger-engine cars with valuations greater than LKR 3 million were excluded to ensure that the control group would be comparable to the treatment group. The sample consists of loan-month observations five months surrounding the tax cut in November 2014 and the main outcome variable is whether the loan is in default in a particular month. Summary statistics for these samples are given in the first two columns of Table 1 . Both treatment and control groups are similar based on the observable borrower and loan characteristics, with the exception of the fraction of brand new vehicles.
Second data set is used in tests that use November 2015 and April 2016 tax hikes for 3-wheeler imports as treatments. Two separate samples were constructed using loan-month observations within a period of five months surrounding each tax hike. The data is restricted to loans initiated for the purchase of vehicles before May 2015 (five months before the first tax hike), where the final payment date came after September 2016 (five months after the second tax hike). Here, 3-wheelers are the treatment sample and, in the baseline regression, all other types of vehicles are considered the control sample. I also construct control samples by matching borrower characteristics and the 'type of vehicle use' to ensure control samples are comparable to the treatment sample. 'Type of vehicle use' indicates whether the underlying vehicle is used for personal use (i.e. as a consumption good) or as a productive asset that generates income. The summary statistics of this sample are given in columns (3) and (4) in Table 1 . Compared to other types of vehicles, loans for 3-wheelers have a shorter term, higher interest rates, and higher loan-to-value ratio, while also yielding more brand new vehicles.
Third data set is used in the tests that use the change in loan-to-value ratio (LTV) caps in January 2017 as the treatment. This sample is restricted to auto loans originated before July 2016, with a maturity date after June 2017, and it consists of loan-month observations from August 2016 to April 2017. Summary statistics for this sample are reported in the last three columns of Table 1 . Compared to other types of vehicles, cars, SUVs and vans have longer terms and significantly lower interest rates.
Empirical Methodology
As mentioned above, I use policy changes on vehicle import tax rates and LTV caps to identify the causal effect of collateral value on borrower default (see section 1. for details). I now describe the empirical methodology.
Import Tax Changes
First, I verify the baseline hypothesis-that tax changes had an impact on resale values of treated vehicles (i.e., smaller-engine cars and 3-wheelers). Having no monthly valuations of all the vehicles pledged as collateral to the lender, I rely on the appraised valuations of used vehicles pledged as collateral for new loans within the five months surrounding each tax change. The central idea is to test whether the valuations of used smaller-engine cars (3-wheelers) dropped (increased) after the tax change(s). I estimate this specification separately for each tax change.
In the case of smaller-engine cars, I use small larger-engine cars as the control sample, and for 3-wheelers I use all the other types of vehicles as the control sample.
where i, v, m, and d represent borrower, vehicle model-manufacturing year, month of loan origination, and district, respectively. Treated Vehicle is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the underlying vehicle is a treated vehicle (i.e., a smaller-engine car or a 3-wheeler). m is a dummy variable representing the number of months since the tax change, meaning m is negative for months before the tax change and positive for months after. This regression includes vehicle model-manufacturing year and district-month fixed effects. The coefficients of interest are β m s, where β m estimates the difference between the value of a used treated and a used control vehicle in month m relative to the same at m = −5, the beginning of the sample period. We expect β m to be zero when m is less than zero and negative (positive) when m is greater than zero in the case of smaller-engine cars (3-wheelers).
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To estimate the impact of the tax rate changes on the default behavior of borrowers, I
implement standard difference-in-difference research designs using each in tax rate change as treatments. In the smaller-engine car sample, I use larger-engine cars as the control group.
For 3-wheelers, I use other types of vehicles as the control group in the baseline specification.
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I use loan-month observations for loans that originated five months before the treatment and that have maturity dates five months after the treatment in both treated and control samples.
The sample begins five months before the treatment and ends five months after the treatment.
Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
where Y imd stands for the outcome variable for loan i in month m in district d. In the baseline specification Y imd is a dummy variable that indicates whether the loan i is in default in month m, where m represents the number of months since the treatment; the period prior to the treatment is indicated by negative values of m. Loan level fixed effects (α i ) are included to capture any time-invariant characteristics of the borrower. District − M onth fixed effects (α md ) account for common shocks across all loans in a given district. I(m > 0) is a dummy variable equal to zero for the period before the tax change and one after the tax change.
Treated Vehicle imd is a dummy variable equal to one for treated vehicle type and zero for the 5 A zero β m when m < 0 provides support for the parallel trends assumption. 6 I construct matched control samples in later tests control sample. The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the difference in the default rate between treated and control samples after the treatment and relative to the same prior to the treatment. I expect the β to be positive for smaller-engine cars and negative for 3-wheelers.
Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV) Restrictions
As a result of the unanticipated changes to the LTV caps, the resale values of used cars, SUVs, vans, and 3-wheelers should increase as buyers who would have bought a new vehicle are now forced to buy a used vehicle. Similarly the values of used trucks and buses should decrease. We expect the default rates of vehicle types whose LTV cap dropped to increase and vice versa.
To verify that the LTV restrictions indeed had an impact on the valuations of vehicles previously pledged as collateral, I implement the following specification. As I did before, I
rely on auto loans initiated to finance the purchase of used vehicles originated five months surrounding the policy change in January 2017.
where i, v, m, and d represent borrower, model-year of the vehicle, month of origination and district respectively. The dummy variable m represents the number of months since the rule change, meaning it is negative for months before the rule change and positive for months after.
Dummy variable I(m > 0) × I(type = p) imd takes the value one for auto loans to finance vehicle type p (where p ∈ (3-wheeler, bus/truck, car/SUV/van)) after the rule change and zero otherwise. This specification includes model-year (α v ) fixed effects and origination monthdistrict (α md ) fixed effects. We expect β p to be positive when p ∈ (3-wheeler, car/SUV/van) and negative when p = bus/truck.
Next, I implement the following specification to understand the effect of changes to LTV caps on default rate. 
Empirical Results
This section documents how unanticipated changes in vehicle import taxes (subsection 4.1) and changes to loan-to-value caps (subsection 4.2) impact borrowers default behavior. First, I verify that each change had significant impact on the resale values of vehicles pledged as collateral. Next, I provide evidence that borrowers respond strategically to these changes. Having established that tax cut had a negative significant impact on the resale value of smaller-engine cars, I next turn to the impact on default. Table 2 presents these results.
Impact of Import Tax
Here, smaller-engine car loans are the treated sample, while the control sample consists of loans initiated to finance purchases of larger-engine cars. Both samples consist of loan-month observations five months surrounding the tax cut. Column (1) presents results from estimation of equation 2. Column (2) includes loan-level and borrower-level control variables, but does not include loan fixed effects. Estimates suggest that default rate for cars with engines increased by 0.4% to 0.6% following the tax cut. This translates to an approximately 44% to 66% increase in the default rate compared to the 0.9% default rate prior to the tax cut. Control variables in column (2) have the expected sign. The high R 2 value in column (1) is due to loan fixed effects.
Identification using difference-in-difference method relies on the parallel trend assumption.
Under this assumption, default rates of both treated and control groups would have trended similarly if there were no tax cut in the treatment sample. To test for the parallel trends assumption, I estimates the following equation: rate of 1.7%, this reduction is highly economically significant. Thus, this result indicates that thee default rate reduced by 18% to 29% following the tax hike.
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 show that results are robust to the inclusion of loan and borrower related controls. Samples in these columns were constructed using the same restrictions. In these regressions I include loan origination month fixed effects to control for difference in the time of loan origination.
One possible concern with my methodology is that other vehicle type borrowers are not an adequate control group because they are too different from 3-wheeler borrowers. One key difference is that 3-wheelers are purchased by less affluent borrowers while other types of vehicles, like cars, are purchased by more affluent borrowers. Thus, one may worry about the possibility that an unobserved shock affected less affluent borrowers at the time of the tax hikes. To address this concern, I use a matched sample of motorbikes as the control sample.
Unlike in the more developed countries, motorbikes in Sri Lanka are purchased mainly by less affluent borrowers who cannot afford cars. Matching was based on borrower characteristics, district and loan origination month using propensity score matching. Results of this exercise are reported in columns (1) and (3) in Table 4 . Interestingly, results in this sample are much stronger than the results shown in Table 3 .
Another concern may be that 3-wheeler owners are systematically different from other vehicle owners as the collateral is a productive asset for the owners and other vehicle types, such as cars, are mostly consumption goods. As such, it is not implausible that some unobservable shock affected only entrepreneurial borrowers around the tax hikes. To address this concern, I compare default rates of 3-wheeler loans with matched mini-truck loans in columns (2) and (4) in Table 4 . Mini-trucks are very small trucks with small engines used to transport small loads. As is the case with 3-wheelers, mini-trucks generate the main source of income for many mini-truck owners. I select mini-truck borrowers who listed their occupation as "self-employed"
or "business" so that they are comparable to the 3-wheeler borrowers in terms of the source of income. Matching is based on the same procedure as above. Descriptive statistics of the samples before and after are given in the Appendix x. Coefficients remain negative and highly statistically significant.
Having established that 3-wheeler default rates decreased following import tax hikes, I next look at whether already defaulted 3-wheeler borrowers self-cure more in response to the tax hikes. If a borrower's previous default was strategic-i.e. if the borrower was in default despite having the ability to pay-this borrower is more likely to self-cure following the tax hikes. Loan i, is defined as a self-cure in month m, if the loan is current in month m, conditional on the loan being in default in month m − 1. Samples were constructed for each month m − 1, using the loans are in default in that month. The self-cure rate is defined as the fraction of loans that are not in default in month m for 3-wheelers and other types of vehicles separately. Figure 9 shows that the self-cure rate of 3-wheeler borrowers increases sharply following the tax hikes. Table 5 Panel A presents the difference-in-difference estimates for the self-cure rates. Following the November 2015 tax hike the self-cure rate increases by 12.3% and self-cure rate increases by 8.1% following the April 2016 tax hike in 3-wheeler loans. Table 5 Panel B shows that the increase in self-cure was not temporary. This table looks at how many borrowers who self-cured just after the tax hikes re-default at any point in the future. While for other types of vehicles, a sizable fraction of the self-cured borrowers re-defaulted subsequently, almost no 3-wheeler borrowers who self-cured re-defaulted afterward. As such, this is consistent with the idea that borrowers who self-cured in response to tax hikes had the ability to pay when they defaulted before the tax hikes.
Impact of Changes to Maximum Loan-to-Value Ratios on Collateral Value and Default
Results in this section look at changes to borrowers' default behavior in response to changes to LTV caps. In January 2017, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka reduced the LTV cap for new cars, SUVs and vans to 50% and for 3-wheelers to 25%. For buses and trucks, the LTV cap was increased to 90%. Prior to this directive, all the vehicles had the same LTV cap of 70%.
After this regulation was implemented, only new vehicles were affected and the LTV cap for used vehicles remained at 70%. This change was initially proposed in late November 2016.
In Table 6 , I provide evidence that changes to the LTV caps had an impact on the valuations of used vehicles. Results in this table indicate that resale values of used trucks and buses dropped by about 20% relative to the values of used 3-wheelers, cars, SUVs and vans. This is due to the emerging lower demand for used trucks and buses caused by lower down-payment requirement for new ones as a result of loosening of LTV restrictions. The sample uses auto loans initiated surrounding the rule change to purchase used vehicles. Table 7 presents the results of regression specification in equation 4, which estimates the magnitude of borrowers' response to changes in the LTV caps. The unit of observation is a loan-month. Column (1) includes loan level fixed effects and district-month fixed effects.
Column (2) employs the full set of borrower/loan level controls and vehicle type, districtmonth and origination month fixed effects. The dummy variable I(type = p) imd × I(m ∈ {F eb2017, M ar2017, Apr2017}) captures the difference in default rate between a given vehicle type p, where p ∈ {Car/SU V /V an, T ruck/Bus}, and the excluded vehicle type (3-wheelers) after the new regulations came in to effect relative to the period before new require-ments were announced (i.e., before Dec 2016). The dummy variable I(type = p) imd × I(m ∈ {Dec2016, Jan2017}) captures the change in default rate after the announcement but before implementation.
Under these conditions, I expect the default rates of loans to finance purchases of trucks and buses to increase relative to 3-wheelers after the new regulations came into effect. As both personal vehicles (cars, SUVs and vans) and three wheelers were subject to higher LTV caps, it is not clear if the default rate of personal vehicles should increase or decrease relative to the 3-wheelers. According to the estimates, there is a positive and significant increase in This pattern is consistent with the idea that decreasing the maximum LTV for new vehicles increased the value of used vehicles, which in turn reduced the probability of default. The estimate of 0.005 for trucks and buses indicates that default rates increased by 0.5%, approximately a 10% increase in the pre-reform default rate. For cars, SUVs and vans a decrease in default rate of about 0.1% compared to 3-wheelers can be observed. Although the down-payment requirement for 3-wheelers increased by 50% compared to the 25% increase for personal vehicles, similar response among borrowers of both personal vehicles and 3-wheelers can be observed.
This indicates that, compared to 3-wheeler borrowers, personal vehicle borrowers are more sensitive to changes in collateral value.
In addition, Figure 10 shows the same result graphically. As demonstrated in this figure, insignificant β m before the treatment supports the parallel trends assumption.
Placebo Tests
Regarding results reported in the previous section, a potential concern centers on the notion that results may be driven by different borrower types who are selecting into different vehicle types. In difference-in-difference, it does not matter if borrowers who select in to different types of vehicle have different default behavior as long as they move in parallel before the treatment, meaning that there were no preexisting trends in default behavior. Graphical evidence presented earlier shows that the parallel trends assumption is likely to be satisfied for untreated periods. In this section, I provide further evidence of the identifying the assumption by simulating placebo policy changes before the actual policy change date, aimed at testing whether the results are driven by preexisting trends. If the previous results are driven by preexisting trends, then these simulations should also generate similar effects on default. (2) is given in Table 9 column (1). Column (2) includes controls with fixed effects. Statistically not significant coefficients in both columns suggest that the identification assumption is valid.
6. Robustness
Prepayment
When a borrower is liquidity constrained, she has two options: prepay the loan by selling the collateral or default on the loan. If the net outcome of the prepayment is positive, the borrower would prepay instead of defaulting and vice versa. One concern with my analysis is that liquidity constrained borrowers may change their behavior in response to changes in the collateral value. In the case of the tax cut for smaller-engine cars, it is possible that the net positive benefit in prepayment is wiped out by the drop in the vehicle value following the tax cut. Therefore, liquidity constrained borrowers who were planning on prepaying their loan by selling the vehicle may now decide to default. My results could be simply capturing this change in response type by liquidity constrained borrowers, not strategic default. Similarly, following the value increases of 3-wheelers following tax hikes liquidity-constrained borrowers may decide to prepay their auto loans, instead of defaulting.
Yet, I note that this is unlikely to be the case due to severe prepayment penalties applicable to auto loan borrowers. If borrowers prepay, they are typically required to pay 75% of future interest in addition to the balance outstanding. As a result, prepayments are not common in auto loans. During my sample period, only 0.16% of the auto loans were prepaid. Regardless, I run a robustness test to rule out this alternative explanation.
As with the previous regressions, I run the equation 2 with Y imd indicating prepayment by borrower i in district d in month m. I include loan fixed effects and district-month fixed effects. Results reported in Table 10 suggest that prepayments did not increase significantly following the tax increases.
As an additional test, I split the sample into three subsamples based on the loan origination date: The first sample includes loan originated between July 2013 and December 2014, the second sample includes loans originated between June 2013 and January 2012 and the third sample includes loans originated before January 2012. Most recently originated loans have the highest outstanding balance at the time of tax increase. As such, incentives to strategically default should be strongest in this sample. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 11 displaying the strongest effect coming from most recently originated loans. This behavior is more consistent with the strategic default hypothesis.
Equity Extraction
Another concern revolves around the idea that if liquidity-constrained borrowers are able to extract their equity in the form of a secondary loan following the increases in collateral value, my results may reflect the impact of relaxed liquidity constraints. Detailed monthly level data allows me to track the total loan balance from month to month. In this data, I do not observe any increase in loan balance after value increases and regulations do not allow borrowers to use the same asset as the collateral for a secondary loan with another lender. In addition, in private conversations, management of the lender also confirmed that there were no equity extractions following the collateral value increases.
Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence that auto loan borrowers respond strategically to changes in the value of the collateral. I use several policy changes in Sri Lanka to generate exogenous variation of collateral value that is unrelated to borrowers' unobservable characteristics and their ability to pay. Results show that following a drop (increase) in collateral value default rate rose (fell) by 44% (25%). The self-cure rate increased three fold after a 10% increase in the collateral value.
I take a number of steps to mitigate the scope for alternative interpretations of my evidence.
I simulate regulation changes in earlier dates to confirm that these results are not driven by preexisting trends. I also match the control sample to treatment sample to address concerns about selection bias.
The findings in this paper contribute to the academic debate on the importance of borrowers' financial incentives on their default decisions and have direct policy implications. This finding is particularly relevant for ex-ante policies aimed at reducing future default rates. Economically significant impact of the collateral value can be used to justify some of the credit market regulations such as maximum LTVs or mortgage insurance. Changes to maximum loan-to-value ratios were proposed late November 2016 and implemented mid January 2017. Maximum loan-to-value ratio was cut to 50% for cars, SUVs and vans while dropping to 25% for 3-wheelers. The bus-truck maximum loan-to-value ratio was increased to 90%. This table shows the impact of November 2014 import tax cut on the default rate of smallerengine car loans initiated prior to the tax cut. Smaller-engine cars (with an engine capacity less than 1L) were affected by the tax cut. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one when borrower i is not current in month m (otherwise zero). The dummy variable I(m > 0) denotes a loan-month observation after the tax cut. Dummy variable Smaller-engine is equal to one when the vehicle type received the treatment (i.e. a smaller-engine car). Larger-engine cars (with an engine capacity greater than 1L) formed the control sample. Column (1) reports the estimation results of equation 2 and column (2) includes controls. Samples consist of loan-month observations five months pre-and post-the tax cut. Standard errors are clustered at loan level and reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. I use *,**, and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
log(valuation)
(1) (2) This table shows the impact of changes to maximum loan-to-value ratio on default.Maximum loan-to-value ratio was increased for new trucks and buses after January 2017, and maximum LTV was lowered for cars, SUVs, vans and 3-wheelers. These changes were first announced in November 2016. This table reports the estimation results of equation 4. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one when borrower i is not current in the month m (otherwise zero). The dummy variables Feb 2017-Apr 2017 and Dec 2016 -Jan 2017 denotes loan-month observations in post-implementation and post-announcement(and pre-implementation) periods, respectively. Dummy variables Trucks and Buses and Cars, SUVs and Vans denote respective vehicle types. Samples consist of loan-month observations from September 2016 through April 2017. Standard errors are clustered at loan level and reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. I use *,**, and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. shows the impact of simulated import tax hike on the default rate of 3-wheeler-loans initiated prior to the simulated tax hike. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one when borrower i is not current in the month m (otherwise zero). The dummy variable I(m > 0) denotes a loan-month observation after the simulated tax hike. Dummy variable 3-wheeler is equal to one if the vehicle type received the treatment (i.e., a 3-wheeler). Other vehicle types formed the control sample. Samples consist of loan-month observations five months pre-and post-simulated tax hike. Standard errors are clustered at loan level and reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. I use *,**, and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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